Conservative, Neo or Otherwise
Ξ January 24th, 2008 | → Comments Off | ∇ Intellectual, Politics |
I frequently read through the comments of politically tinged threads at Slashdot (and used to at Digg as well, but the sheer inanity forced me to stop), and I’ve come to realize that for all the indignation expressed towards the “neo-conservative” that there is a shocking amount of ignorance towards what an actual “neo-conservative” is. To listen to it’s detractors, a neo-conservative is a sinister, shadowy figure that works to manipulate policy for personal gain – frequently in concert with other powerful neo-conservatives. And depending on the mood of the detractor, they may or may not be a Christian fundamentalist. Actually, it sounds an awful lot like the description of the anti-semitic concept of the “International Jew” that so pervaded Europe in the 19th and early 20th century (and is on the rise again). In fact, in conservative circles, it is not uncommon to hear the theory that rantings against neo-conservatives is actually thinly-veiled antisemitism, especially since so many prominent neo-conservatives are Jewish.
So what, then, is a “conservative”, and what is a “neo-conservative”, and what is the difference between the two? While pinning down an exact definition of any ideology is difficult and is surprisingly similar to the Heisenberg Principle (that is the closer you examine it, the less you actually know), I do think a rough over-view of conservatism and neo-conservatism is worthwhile and instructive.
I’ve been reading through Jonah Goldberg’s Liberal Fascism, which so far has been a brilliant book, which has a basic assertion that liberalism, fascism and socialism/communism all trace their roots to the French Revolution. When one thinks about it, it makes a lot of sense, insofar as the French Revolution was a bottom-up populist attempt to reorganize society according to the vision of it’s leaders. Goldberg goes into some depth on the subject – I won’t bother to repeat his argument here because this isn’t about liberalism but about conservatism – but comes around to the conclusion that it is also with the French Revolution that we find the birth of what we can consider modern conservatism.
During the American Revolution, there were many in Britain that sympathized with the cause and goals of the American colonists, and saw in the rebels the spiritual successor to the idealists of the British civil war. Men such as Edmund Burke and John Wilkes not only supported the American cause, but were staunch opponents of (and in the case of Wilkes, agitated against) institutions that were considered quintessentially British, such as the British East India Company, or the policies regarding Ireland. These men could be considered the “liberals” of their time.
The French Revolution, however, changed them deeply. They watched what was going on in France, and recoiled in horror as they saw the butchery and terror sweep through country. Whereas these “radicals” had supported the American Revolution, they realized that something very dangerous had been set loose in Europe, and their views began to change in reaction to the blood-letting occurring on the Continent. These “radicals” began to espouse a respect for tradition and established culture, and warn against unbridled reform.
That is the defining characteristic of Conservatism – a belief that culture and tradition is repository of wisdom and knowledge collected across generations, and that it is hubris to believe that any one generation knows better to reform a society from the top down. One of the seminal works of modern conservatism, The Conservative Mind by Russel Kirk, traces back the budding conservative movement of the 1950′s directly to Burke – indeed the subtitle for the book is From Burke to Eliot. William F. Buckley, in what can be considered the birth of modern conservatism in the 1950′s, inaugurated the launch of National Review with the rallying cry that the conservative publication looked to “Stand athwart history, yelling ‘Stop!’”. What was he yelling to stop? Twenty-five years of progressive policies – attempts to change American society from the top down, from FDR through Eisenhower.
So if a conservative is, in a nutshell, one who says it is unwise to attempt a top-down reform of society, what then is a “neo-conservative”? Again, it’s instructive to go back to the French Revolution. Burke, Wilkes, et al where all of a ideological bent that, at first glance, would seem sympathetic to the Revolution, but began to see that any good that could come out of it was being overshadowed by the damage of the unrestrained “reforms” taking place, and their ideology changed in reaction to it. A similar reaction took place amongst those of a liberal bent during the Cold War. Many of those who had, in earlier years, had a liberal bent began to look upon the lurch of the left towards radicalism in the 60′s and 70′s – especially after the ’68 Democratic National Convention and the subsequent radical nomination of George McGovern in 1972, and began to recoil in horror at what they saw and began to see merit in the conservative movement, in particular what they saw in the failed Presidential candidate Barry Goldwater’s 1964 run.
It is important at this point to note that there are three basic aspects of conservatism – social, economic and foreign policy. Frequently people assume that a conservative needs to be “conservative” in all three areas, and that’s simply not the case. In fact, the coalition that has been the fundamental backbone of the Republican party since 1980 has been a coalition of social and economic conservatives – an alliance between people like Pat Robertson and Jerry Falwell and people like the Wall Street Journal – two groups that have different (but, crucially, non-conflicting) goals.
Given that background, what then is a neo-conservative? These former liberals saw room in this coalition for themselves – they didn’t share the social conservatism of the “evangelicals”, but were both economic conservatives and (as a defining characteristic) hawkish and confrontational in the area of foreign policy. They felt the commuism and other repressive, aggressive ideologies needed to be stood up to, and that it was America’s duty to do so. What it specifically was not was a movement defined by Christian fundamentalists – in fact most members are ambivalent to social issues, and generally trend personally towards “liberal” social policies. Considering that Jews (such as Charles Krauthammer, Bill Kristol, Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz and David Horowitz) are prominent neo-conservatives, it simply doesn’t make sense to describe it as a Christian movement.
If the the neo-conservatives tend to be socially liberal, how can they be in the same coalition as social conservatives? Because they share the same core principles as all conservatives – that the government should not attempt to reorganize society from the top down. While they don’t see eye to eye with social conservatives, they aren’t interested in attempting to legislate policies that would clash with social conservatives – they’d rather allow local communities regulate themselves (in America, that means at least letting the States decide what laws on social issues to pass). While social conservatives may (or may not, depending on which one you talk to) prefer to pass social legislation across the nation, most feel that this is a perfectly acceptable compromise.
And I think that most people, regardless of whether or not they are Evangelical, Jewish, secular or other would feel that’s an acceptable compromise.
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